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Emotional stimuli automatically recruit attentional resources. Although this usually brings
more adaptive responses, it may suppose a disadvantage when emotional information
is task-irrelevant and should be ignored. Previous studies have shown how emotional
stimuli with a negative content exert a greater interference than neutral stimuli during
a concurrent working memory (WM) task. However, the impact of positively valenced
stimuli as interference has not been addressed to date. In three experiments and one
re-analysis we explore the impact of pleasant and unpleasant emotional distractors
during WM maintenance. The results suggest that our cognitive control can cope with
the interference posed by pleasant distractors as well as with the interference posed
by neutral stimuli. However, unpleasant distractors are harder to control in the context
of WM maintenance. As unpleasant stimuli usually convey relevant information that we
should not to ignore, our executive control seems to be less able to reallocate cognitive
resources after unpleasant distraction.
Keywords: working memory, forgetting, emotional distraction, cognitive inhibition, interference
Introduction
The effect of emotion on our cognition and behavior is an issue widely addressed by the
psychological literature. The wealthy interactions between these “hot” and “cold” systems have
attracted widespread attention. In particular, interactions between memory and emotion are
particularly interesting due to the opposing consequences seen when emotional information is
a relevant part of the current activity (Canli et al., 2000), contrary to when emotional facts are
irrelevant. Emotional stimuli automatically fall into the focus of our attention (Mogg et al., 1997;
Ohman et al., 2001; Armony and Dolan, 2002). Such an effect is explained by their biological
relevance, since emotional stimuli contain information that is important for survival (e.g., food
or predators) (LeDoux, 1996; Ohman et al., 2000; Anderson and Phelps, 2001). The concept of
“motivated attention” (Lang et al., 1993, 1998b) proposes that emotional information seems to
have a privileged access to our cognitive system, by recruiting attentional resources automatically
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and improving our preparation to process it (Lang et al., 1998;
Morris et al., 1998; Bradley et al., 2003; Sabatinelli et al., 2005).
This phenomenon usually brings more adaptive responses since
we can easily and accurately remember information crucial to
our survival. Many laboratory studies have reported enhanced
memory for emotional pictures (Canli et al., 2000), emotional
word-lists (Jones et al., 1987; Dietrich et al., 2001), or for
humor (Schmidt and Williams, 2001). However, there are other
situations in which the most adaptive behavior consists precisely
in ignoring emotional information, for example to accomplish
a more immediate goal. It is in these circumstances when
the biological salience of emotional stimuli, and our natural
predisposition to deeply process them, turn those events into
powerful interferences that compete with relevant information
for cognitive resources (Ellis and Ashbrook, 1988). This finally
results in a worsening of performance of the current task (Dolcos
and McCarthy, 2006; Dolcos et al., 2008; Anticevic et al., 2010;
Chuah et al., 2010; Denkova et al., 2010).
Detrimental effects of emotional interference on working
memory (WM) provide an opportunity to explore the limits
of cognitive control in memory, taking into account that
evolution has prepared us to pay attention to emotional stimuli
(Lang et al., 1998; Morris et al., 1998; Bradley et al., 2003;
Sabatinelli et al., 2005). Ignoring threatening stimuli, such as
an approaching predator, might be detrimental to our survival.
On the other side, task-irrelevant stimuli should be ignored in
order to avoid interference effects in WM to perform many
everyday tasks. Indeed, suppression of unpleasant information
may be considered essential for our mental health. Dealing with
negative intrusive thoughts, memories, and images are part of
our daily life, and difficulties in their control are part of the
core symptoms related to anxiety and depression (Küpper et al.,
2014; Catarino et al., 2015). In such a scenario, being able
to prevent attention towards emotional information constitutes
the most adaptive response, particularly when emotional
information is not relevant or even detrimental for to immediate
goals.
To our knowledge, few studies have addressed the issue of
interference-based forgetting in WM due to the appearance of
emotional distractors. Dolcos and colleagues, for example, have
conducted a series of fMRI studies using several modifications
of the same WM task. In an early study (Dolcos and McCarthy,
2006), they used a delayed-recognition WM task with sets
of three human faces as items to be memorized and pictures
depicting unpleasant and neutral scenes, as well as digitally
scrambled versions of these pictures, as distractors presented
during the delay interval. The worst recognition scores were
associated with the appearance of unpleasant distractors. These
results confirm the idea previously introduced: emotional stimuli
exerted a more powerful interference than non-emotional
distractors in WM. However, in a later study using a similar
task (Dolcos et al., 2008), they did not find any behavioral effect.
Further exploration identified a subgroup of participants who
seem to profit from emotional interference. Other studies from
this group have been developed to investigate the effect of sleep
deprivation (Chuah et al., 2010) and anxiety-induced distraction
(Denkova et al., 2010) in WM. They replicated the main effect of
worse WM performance after unpleasant distraction, than after
non-emotional distraction.
In a similar vein, Anticevic et al. (2010) addressed this issue
in a delayed-recognition WM task using complex geometric
shapes as relevant items to memorize and recognize. During
the maintenance stage, three types of distractors were presented:
unpleasant emotional pictures, neutral pictures, and task-related
geometric shapes. A fourth condition was added as non-
interference, in which no distractor was introduced. The authors
also manipulated the difficulty of the task by including trials
in which either two or four geometric shapes were presented
at the encoding stage. Consistent with previous work (Dolcos
and McCarthy, 2006; Chuah et al., 2010; Denkova et al., 2010),
unpleasant distractors were associated with a worsening of
accuracy compared with neutral distractors in low WM load
trials. In the high load condition, negative and neutral stimuli
seemed equally disruptive. According to the authors, the lack
of an effect for emotional interference under high load is
explained because, as difficulty increases, the effect of negative
emotional interference was not detectable and therefore all types
of distraction may have been equally disruptive.
Hence, results from different studies from several groups
suggest that unpleasant emotional irrelevant stimuli seem to
worsen the maintenance of neutral relevant information in WM
(Dolcos and McCarthy, 2006; Anticevic et al., 2010; Chuah
et al., 2010), although this effect might not be very consistent,
since in some other studies it has been found only in a subset
of participants (Dolcos et al., 2008) or only within the most
confident responses (Denkova et al., 2010). Furthermore, all these
previous studies on the interaction of emotional interference and
WM performance have left open many important issues on how
we regulate emotional interference over WM information.
First, and critically, the effect of pleasant emotional
interference in WM is still an open issue. Some authors
have pointed out that stimuli with higher levels of arousal could
recruit more attentional resources (Lang et al., 1998), disrupting
performance when they are not relevant for the ongoing task.
But, has the affective valence of those highly arousing stimuli
any influence on their power as distractors? Both positively
and negatively valenced stimuli seem to recruit attentional
resources because of their importance for survival (Bradley et al.,
2003) and are thus associated with higher arousal than neutral
stimuli. In this regard, both pleasant and unpleasant stimuli
have been shown to capture attention automatically (Keil and
Ihssen, 2004; Keil et al., 2006; De Oca et al., 2012). However,
positively and negatively valenced stimuli differ critically in
their consequences for our survival: while unpleasant stimuli are
associated with threatening and avoidance behaviors, pleasant
stimuli enhance approaching behaviors. Both arousal and valence
are key dimensions in emotional processing (Lang et al., 1998a).
However, by using only emotionally unpleasant stimuli, previous
studies are not able to tease apart the role of arousal and valence
in emotional interference in WM. Exploring the effect of both
pleasant and unpleasant interference in comparison with neutral
interference might provide us with valuable information about
the mechanisms that make this type of stimuli powerful sources
of interference.
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A second issue arising from previous studies is whether
participants might be able or not to completely ignore neutral
stimuli in comparison with emotional distractors. The impact of
non-emotional interference in WM has been largely explored,
leading to several interpretations of the interference-based
forgetting in short-term memory (Nairne, 1990; Jolicoeur and
Dell’Acqua, 1998; Farrell and Lewandowsky, 2002; Barrouillet
et al., 2004; Wixted, 2004; Oberauer and Kliegl, 2006). According
to these theories, most kinds of interfering stimulus might be
able to disrupt to some extent WM performance, in comparison
to a distraction-free scenario. But results from studies in
emotional-based interference in WM have been inconclusive
on this issue. As stated before, the first study by Dolcos and
McCarthy (2006) showed a stronger effect of unpleasant stimuli
on WM performance, followed by neutral and, finally, by
scrambled pictures. Accuracy was also lower for neutral than
for scrambled distractors. These results are in accordance with
interference-based forgetting theories (Berman et al., 2009) since
the introduction of any kind of distracting stimuli impaired the
recovery of information in comparison with a non-meaningful
scrambled picture. This might support the idea of a graded
interference from non-meaningful to neutral and finally to
emotional stimuli. But some other studies have not found
differences when comparing the disruption exerted by scrambled
pictures and neutral stimuli (Chuah et al., 2010; Denkova et al.,
2010). According to these results, one possibility that cannot
be excluded is that the content of neutral stimuli which are
irrelevant for theWM task is blocked out from entering intoWM
and thus does not cause interference. The difference between
the interference posed by neutral and emotional stimuli might
then depend on whether that stimulus enters WM or not. In
other words, emotional stimuli might automatically gain access,
while neutral ones might be blocked out whenever they are not
task-relevant.
One way of examining whether or not this is the case is
to introduce a non-interference condition as well. Anticevic
et al. (2010) added this non-interference condition to their
experimental setting, in which no distractor was presented.
Surprisingly, no differences appeared in high WM load
and accuracy for the non-interference condition was lower
than for all distraction conditions. The authors explained
this unexpected pattern as an artifact of their experimental
design. All the conditions were pseudo-randomly presented
so that the non-interference condition appeared during more
than three consecutive trials. This made distraction trials
much more common than free-distraction trials and therefore
volunteers may have been surprised by the recognition
stimulus on the non-interference trials. This hypothesis was
supported by additional data using the same task but in
which free-distraction trials were presented in a separate
block, instead of intermixed with distraction trials (Anticevic
et al., 2010). Using this blocked design, performance after
non-interference was substantially better than after distraction
conditions.
Other way to better understand if the difference between
emotional and non-emotional distraction depends on whether
or not they are blocked out from entering into WM would
be to ensure that participants pay attention to both kinds
of distracting stimuli. For instance, volunteers might be
asked to respond to a question about the distracting stimuli.
This would compel emotional and non-emotional stimuli to
be attended, and thus any difference in their distracting
power on the main WM task would not be attributable
to an absence of attention allocated to neutral stimuli, but
to the higher engagement caused by emotionally relevant
stimuli.
Hence, the aim of the present work was to investigate how
valence and arousal contribute to the interference posed by
emotionally stimuli. Therefore, we used not only unpleasant,
but also pleasant pictures as distractors in the context of a
WM task. Based on the concept of motivated attention, we
expected both kinds of emotional stimuli to automatically
recruit attentional resources and disrupt WM performance to
a higher extent than neutral stimuli do. Also, we aimed to
clarify whether the difference between neutral and emotional
stimuli arises because neutral stimuli are blocked out of
attention while emotional stimuli are not, or because the
latter are processed on a deeper level than the former once
they all have access WM. If the difference between emotional
and non-emotional interference comes from blocking non-
emotional distractors out of attention, we expected performance
when facing non-emotional interference to be indistinguishable
from a non-interference scenario. Further, if the differential
disruption posed by emotional distraction arises because of
a lack of attention paid to neutral stimuli, the differences
between emotional and non-emotional stimuli should vanish
when people are explicitly asked to pay attention to any type of
distractor.
We addressed these issues through three interrelated
experiments and a re-analysis of the data from these experiments,
using a WM task in which neutral faces were task-relevant items
and emotional and non-emotional pictures were task-irrelevant
distractors. In the first experiment we explored the mechanisms
that make emotional stimuli powerful interferences. To do this,
we included three experimental conditions in which pleasant,
neutral, and unpleasant pictures were displayed as interference
during themaintenance stage of theWM task.We aimed to verify
whether pleasant interference has the same detrimental effect
that unpleasant distractors have shown. Thus, contributions of
both valence and arousal dimensions were investigated. In the
second experiment, we further explored potential differences
in the effects of emotional and non-emotional distraction in
comparison with a non-interference scenario by adding a fourth
condition to the original design, in which no stimulus was
presented during the maintenance of task-relevant information.
In the last experiment, we controlled the actual attentional
engagement of our participants across conditions in order to
discard potential differences in attentional capture that might
be affecting the WM performance. Finally, we re-analyzed data
from Experiments 2 and 3 to account for potential contributions
of the arousal to the power of emotional stimuli as distractors
in WM.
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Experiment 1
In the first experiment, we explored the effect of two valenced
emotional distractors, pleasant, unpleasant, as well as the effect of
neutral distraction in WM maintenance. If detrimental effects
of unpleasant distraction were due to the biological relevance
of emotional stimuli, other types of biologically relevant stimuli
(i.e., pleasant events) should affect performance in a similar
way. If this were the case, the worsening of performance by
emotional distraction would seem to be mainly arousal-driven.
Indeed, taking into account that pleasant stimuli are usually more
arousing than neutral ones, but less arousing than unpleasant
stimuli, performance after pleasant distraction should be better
than after unpleasant distraction, but worse than after neutral
distraction.
Method
Participants
Participants were 30 students from the Complutense University
of Madrid and the Camilo José Cela University of Madrid
(mean age 21 year and a range between 18 and 35 years).
They had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. The experiment
was approved by the institutional Review Committee of
the Center for Biomedical Technology (Technical University
of Madrid and Complutense University of Madrid) and
the procedure was performed in accordance with approved
guidelines and regulations. This approval also covered the
following experiments reported here. Half of the participants
were females (18–35 years old and a mean age of 19.46 years)
and half of them were males (18–34 years old and a mean age
of 22.66 years). They all completed the Spanish version of the
Spielberger State-Trait Anxiety Inventory for Adults (Spielberger
et al., 2002) and the Beck Depression Inventory (Beck et al., 2006)
(see Table 1 for demographic information). Participants received
course credits for their time.
Materials
Items at encoding and recognition stages consisted of colored
images of neutral faces. An oval mask was applied along the
contours of the faces to remove ears and hair and avoid
TABLE 1 | Volunteer’s demographic information in Experiment 1, 2, and 3.
Age STAI-S STAI-T BDI
EXPERIMENT 1
Mean 21.06 16.50 17.33 5.40
SD 5.00 8.26 8.50 4.28
EXPERIMENT 2
Mean 21.69 15.41 16.86 6.81
SD 4.48 6.07 8.76 5.66
EXPERIMENT 3
Mean 21.23 17.04 19.2 9.30
SD 2.62 9.10 11.70 6.22
STAI-S, Spielberger State-Trait Anxiety Inventory for Adults—State score; STAI-S,
Spielberger State-Trait Anxiety Inventory for Adults—Trait score; BDI, Beck Depression
Inventory.
any potential non-face specific cues. A pair of faces was
presented at the encoding stage while just one face was displayed
at the recognition stage. Faces were counterbalanced across
experimental conditions. For the distracting items presented
at the maintenance period, 90 pictures from the International
Affective Picture System (IAPS) (Lang et al., 2005) were selected
and matched in luminance, contrast, color, and figure-ground
relationships. They were divided into three experimental sets
according to their normative valence and arousal ratings:
pleasant, neutral, and unpleasant pictures (see Table 2 for mean
normative values).
Procedure
A delayed-recognition WM paradigm with three experimental
conditions, pleasant, neutral and unpleasant distractionwas used.
Each condition comprised 30 trials. Each trial began with a
1000ms intertrial interval (ITI), followed by the presentation of
a pair of faces for 2000ms (encoding phase). After a 1000ms
blank screen, an interfering stimulus was displayed for 2000ms,
followed by another 1000ms blank screen (maintenance phase).
Next, just one face appeared on the screen for 1500ms, followed
by a 500ms blank screen (recognition stage). Participants had
to decide whether the face at the recognition stage had been
one of the two previously encoded or not, by pressing one of
two keys (Figure 1). Before the experiment, all of the volunteers
underwent four training trials in order to ensure that they
completely understood the task. To avoid inducing long-lasting
mood states, the order of trials were constrained so that no
more than three trials of the same condition were consecutively
presented. Once the WM paradigm was completed, all the
pictures used as distractors were presented to the participants and
they were asked to rate them regarding emotional valence and
arousal, using the Self-Assessment Manikin (SAM) self-report
scale (Lang, 1980). Participants were allowed to see each picture
for as long as they wanted. The order of presentation of the
pictures was also constrained in the same way, although in a
different sequence, as the WM task.
Results
Accuracy
Figure 2A plots the corrected recognition score (hit rate—false
alarm rate) for each condition, averaged across participants.
A One-Way repeated-measures analysis of variance (ANOVA)
revealed a significant main effect of condition [F(2, 28) = 9.60,
p < 0.001, η2 = 0.40]. Pairwise comparisons revealed a
lower performance during unpleasant compared to pleasant
(p < 0.005) and neutral distraction (p < 0.001). There
were no differences between pleasant and neutral distraction
(p > 0.1). These results were confirmed when statistical analyses
were computed on the d’-values estimated for each condition
[F(2, 28) = 11.19, p < 0.0001, η
2
= 0.44; pleasant > unpleasant
(p < 0.005); neutral > unpleasant (p < 0.0001); pleasant =
neutral (p > 0.1)].
Reaction Times
Figure 2B shows the mean reaction times for correctly
recognized items for each condition. Results from One-Way
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TABLE 2 | Mean normative values of pictures used in Experiment 1, 2, and 3, and mean subjective ratings of those pictures by our volunteers.
Condition IAPS Valence IAPS Arousal Subjective Valence Subjective Arousal
EXPERIMENT 1
Pleasant 7.33(0.33) 5.84(0.33) 7.14(0.52) 5.35(1.20)
Neutral 4.91(0.35) 2.77(0.35) 5.09(0.52) 2.27(0.50)
Unpleasant 2.29(0.70) 6.54(0.70) 2.23(0.82) 6.48(0.48)
EXPERIMENT 2
Pleasant 7.34(0.32) 6.23(0.53) 7.09(0.46) 5.40(1.01)
Neutral 4.91(0.35) 2.77(0.38) 5.09(0.55) 1.92(0,66)
Unpleasant 2.39(0.67) 6.23(0.56) 2.37(0.97) 6.71(0.91)
EXPERIMENT 3
Pleasant 7.34(0.32) 6.23(0.53) 7.48(0.96) 5.86(1.69)
Neutral 4.91(0.35) 2.77(0.38) 5.05(0.62) 3.10(1.4)
Unpleasant 2.39(0.67) 6.23(0.56) 2.40(1.02) 6.261(1.49)
Standard deviations are showed in parenthesis.
FIGURE 1 | Diagram of the delayed-recognition WM paradigm in
Experiment 1. Three types of distractors (pleasant, neutral, and unpleasant)
were pseudorandomly presented during the maintenance stage. Volunteers
were trained to learn and maintain the pair of faces into WM, look at the
distractor, and then decide whether the face at the recognition stage was
one of the two previously encoded or not, by pressing one of two keys.
repeated-measures ANOVA yielded a main effect of condition
[F(2, 28) = 11.87, p < 0.001, η
2
= 0.45]. Pairwise comparisons
revealed slower performance during unpleasant compared to
pleasant (p < 0.0001) and neutral distraction (p < 0.005). No
differences were found between pleasant and neutral distraction
(p > 0.1).
Subjective Emotional Ratings
As expected, subjective valence ratings differed as a function
of affective category [F(2, 28) = 284.85, p < 0.0001, η
2
=
0.95], with pleasant pictures rated as most pleasant followed by
neutral pictures, and unpleasant pictures rated as least pleasant
(p < 0.0001 for all comparisons). Arousal ratings also varied
as a function of affective category [F(2, 28) = 139.47, p <
0.0001, η2 = 0.90], with pleasant and unpleasant pictures
rated as more arousing than neutral pictures (p < 0.0001
for both comparisons). Unpleasant pictures were rated as more
arousing than pleasant pictures (p <.0001) (see Table 2 for mean
normative values and mean subjective values).
Item Analysis
To test the relationship between the emotional features of
pictures and their value as distractors during the WM task, we
averaged the recognition and reaction time for each trial in
which they appeared across participants. Then, we calculated the
correlation between these measures and the mean valence and
arousal subjective rating for each distractor. Valence correlated
positively with accuracy [ρs(88) = 0.22, p < 0.05] and negatively
with reaction time [ρs(88) = −0.37, p < 0.001], while arousal
correlated positively with reaction time [ρs(88) = 0.22, p < 0.05],
but did not with accuracy [ρs(88) = −0.16, p > 0.1]. Since both
pleasant and unpleasant stimuli were highly arousing, partial
correlations were calculated in order to test whether one of them
was leading the correlation effect. Valence correlated positively
with accuracy (ρvalence, accuracy · arousal = 0.21, p < 0.05)
and negatively with reaction time (ρvalence, accuracy · arousal=
−0.30, p < 0.005) when the effect of arousal was controlled. No
significant correlation was found between arousal and accuracy
(ρvalence, accuracy · arousal = −0.12, p > 0.1) nor between
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FIGURE 2 | (A) Corrected recognition scores (hit rate—false alarm
rate) in Experiment 1. Unpleasant distractors caused a detrimental
effect on WM accuracy, compared to neutral and pleasant
distractors (*p < 0.005; **p < 0.001). (B) Mean reaction times for
accurate recognitions in Experiment 1. Unpleasant distractors caused
a slower performance on WM, compared to neutral and pleasant
distractors (*p < 0.005; **p < 0.0001). Error bars represent standard
error of mean.
arousal and reaction time (ρvalence, accuracy · arousal = 0.11,
p > 0.1) when the effect of valence was controlled.
Discussion
One of the major aims of this first experiment was to clarify
previous results suggesting that unpleasant emotional stimuli
disrupt WM maintenance of non-emotional information more
than neutral stimuli. In accordance to the literature (Dolcos
and McCarthy, 2006; Dolcos et al., 2008; Anticevic et al.,
2010; Chuah et al., 2010; Denkova et al., 2010) unpleasant
distraction does affect WM more than neutral distraction,
resulting in enhanced forgetting. Analysis of reaction times
for correct responses also showed this pattern, with slower
responses after unpleasant than after neutral distraction. This
suggests that unpleasant interference increases the probability
of forgetting and produces higher cognitive costs even for
successful performance. This effect may be explained under
the concept of motivated attention (Bradley et al., 2003) which
refers to the automatic attentional resources captured by those
stimuli that represent information linked to survival. As posed
above, this capture of attentional resources means an advantage
when emotion is task relevant, since it drives a deeper and
more effective processing of those stimuli (Bradley et al., 2003).
However, when emotion is not task relevant, this attentional
capture and the following preferential processing of the attended
information turns emotional stimuli into powerful interferences
that compete with relevant information for cognitive resources.
This finally worsens performance of the ongoing task (Dolcos and
McCarthy, 2006; Dolcos et al., 2008; Anticevic et al., 2010; Chuah
et al., 2010; Denkova et al., 2010).
A second major aim of this experiment was to investigate
whether pleasant distraction affects WM in a similar manner to
unpleasant distraction. If we assume that emotional features of
stimuli turn them into powerful interferences, pleasant stimuli,
which also represent biologically relevant information, such
as food or reproduction, should also recruit more attentional
resources and, therefore, should also be preferentially processed.
Thus, they should compete with relevant information for
attentional resources and they should produce a similar amount
of forgetting for such information. Unexpectedly, pleasant
distraction does not affect maintenance of information in WM
more than neutral distraction. These results suggest that, contrary
to our initial hypothesis, the power of emotional stimuli as
interference in WM is not only driven by arousal. If this
were the case, pleasant distractors would have produced lower
WM performance than neutral distractors, but higher WM
performance than unpleasant distraction. As this was not the
case, the valence of emotional stimuli must contribute to their
value as distractors. Partial correlation analysis from our data
confirmed this hypothesis. Valence correlated significantly with
performance when the effect of arousal was controlled, so that
the more unpleasant the distractor was, the higher probability
of forgetting the previously encoded information. Also, higher
levels of unpleasantness in the stimuli predicted higher
cognitive costs for correct responses, as reflected by reaction
times.
Previous studies in the attentional blink phenomenon have
showed that both pleasant and unpleasant stimuli equally capture
more attention than neutral stimuli (Keil and Ihssen, 2004;
Keil et al., 2006; De Oca et al., 2012). Thus, it seems not very
probable that, in our study, differences in WM performance
between pleasant and unpleasant distraction were due to a higher
attentional capture by unpleasant stimuli, when compared with
pleasant distractors. However, our executive control, specifically
our inhibitory control, may not be equally capable of reallocating
cognitive resources after the initial attentional response elicited
by pleasant and by unpleasant distractors. Unpleasant stimuli
convey important biological information that the brain has
learned not to ignore, such as information related to threatening
events. Therefore, it seems reasonable that such reallocation
of cognitive resources towards the memory maintenance of
the previously encoded relevant information was weaker after
unpleasant distractors than after another kind of biologically
relevant, but not threatening stimuli (Dolcos and McCarthy,
2006; Dolcos et al., 2008; Anticevic et al., 2010; Chuah et al., 2010;
Denkova et al., 2010).
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Experiment 2
In the second experiment we first tried to confirm the unexpected
finding of equivalent performance after pleasant and neutral
distraction showed in Experiment 1. Second, we adjusted the
selection of distractors in order to make pleasant and unpleasant
conditions equal in arousal. Finally, we attempted to reveal
potential differences in the effect of emotional and non-
emotional distraction in comparison to a no-distraction scenario.
As previously stated, the comparison of a neutral and a free
distraction condition might help us disentangle whether neutral
pictures are also posing a significant interference in WM or not.
Method
Participants
Participants were 43 students from the Complutense University
of Madrid and the Camilo José Cela University of Madrid (mean
age 21.6 years; range from 18 to 40 years). They had normal or
corrected-to-normal vision. 24 participants were females (18–33
years old and a mean age of 21.7 years) and 19 were males (18–40
years old and a mean age of 21.6 years). They all completed the
Spanish version of the Spielberger State-Trait Anxiety Inventory
for Adults (Spielberger et al., 2002) and the Beck Depression
Inventory (Beck et al., 2006) (see Table 1 for demographic
information).
Materials
Items at encoding and recognition were exactly the same as
those used in Experiment 1(see Materials in Experiment 1), and
they were also counterbalanced across experimental conditions.
For the distracting items presented at the maintenance period,
90 pictures from the IAPS (Lang et al., 2005) were selected
and matched in luminance, contrast, color and figure-ground
relationships. They were divided into pleasant, neutral and
unpleasant pictures. For this experiment we adjusted the criterion
of selection to insure that pleasant and unpleasant conditions
were equal in arousal (see Table 2 for mean normative values).
Procedure
A delayed-recognition WM paradigm with four experimental
conditions no-distraction, pleasant, neutral, and unpleasant
distraction was used and all conditions comprised 30 trials. The
trial structure, times of presentation and instructions were the
same as those used in Experiment 1. The order of trials was also
constrained in the same way as in Experiment 1 (see Procedure
in Experiment 1). However, no-distraction trials were presented
in a separate block to avoid potential experimental artifacts.
Although a blocked presentation of the no-distraction condition
may be considered a methodological inconvenience, results from
previous studies have shown that it is a suitable approach to
prevent experimental artifacts that have already been reported,
and that may affect performance in WM maintenance after no-
distraction (Anticevic et al., 2010). That is, if presentation of all
of the 120 trials would have been intermixed, distraction trials
would have been much more common than no-distraction trials.
In addition, the period of time without any visual stimulation
during the maintenance stage was would have been much longer
in no-distraction (4 s) than in distraction trials (1 s at the most)
(see Figure 3). Therefore, volunteers might have been surprised
by the appearance of a no-distraction trial. This could produce
a worsening in performance for this condition not related to
the processes we are interested in (Anticevic et al., 2010).
Additionally, the order of presentation of no-distraction and
interference blocks was counterbalanced across participants in
order to eliminate any potential practice or fatigue effect.
Results
Accuracy
Figure 4A plots the corrected recognition score (hit rate—false
alarm rate) for each condition, averaged across participants.
A One-Way repeated-measures ANOVA revealed a significant
main effect of condition [F(3, 40) = 19.76, p < 0.0001, η
2
=
0.59]. Pairwise comparisons showed lower performance during
unpleasant distraction compared to no-distraction (p < 0.0001),
pleasant (p < 0.001) and neutral distraction (p < 0.001).
Performance during pleasant and neutral distraction was also
worse than during no-distraction (p < 0.0001; and p < 0.005,
respectively). No differences were found between pleasant and
neutral distraction (p > 0.1). These results were confirmed when
statistical analysis were computed on the d’-values estimated for
each condition [F(3, 40) = 16.23, p < 0.0001, η
2
= 0.54; no-
distraction > pleasant (p < 0.0001), neutral (p < 0.005) and
unpleasant (p < 0.0001); pleasant > unpleasant (p < 0.0001);
neutral > unpleasant (p < 0.0001); pleasant = neutral (p >
0.1)].
Reaction Times
Figure 4B shows mean reaction times for correctly recognized
items in each condition. Results from One-Way repeated-
measures ANOVA yielded a main effect of condition [F(3, 40) =
5.34, p < 0.005, η2 = 0.28]. Pairwise comparisons showed
faster performance during pleasant compared to no-distraction
(p < 0.005) and unpleasant distraction (p < 0.05). Results from
post-hoc comparisons also showed a faster performance during
neutral than during no-distraction scenario (p < 0.05). Although
not significant, our volunteers tended to respond slower after
unpleasant than after neutral distraction (p = 0.08). There were
no differences between pleasant and neutral distraction (p >
0.1), nor between unpleasant and no-distraction (p > 0.1).
Subjective Emotional Ratings
As expected, subjective valence ratings differed as a function of
affective category [F(2, 41) = 239.18, p < 0.0001, η
2
= 0.92],
with pleasant pictures rated as most pleasant followed by neutral
pictures, and unpleasant pictures rated as least pleasant (p <
0.0001). Arousal ratings also varied as a function of affective
category [F(2, 41) = 162.04, p < 0.0001, η
2
= 0.88], with
pleasant and unpleasant pictures rated as more arousing than
neutral pictures (p < 0.0001 for all comparisons). Although
both pleasant and unpleasant pictures were selected to be equal
in arousal, our volunteers rated, on average, unpleasant pictures
asmore arousing than pleasant pictures (p < 0.0001) (seeTable 2
for mean normative values and mean subjective values).
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FIGURE 3 | Diagram of the delayed-recognition WM paradigm in
Experiment 2 and 3. Three types of distractors (pleasant, neutral, and
unpleasant) were pseudorandomly presented during the maintenance stage.
Volunteers were trained to learn and maintain the pair of faces into WM, look
at the distractor, and then decide whether the face at the recognition stage
was one of the two previously encoded or not, by pressing one of two keys.
In a separate block, volunteers performed a fourth experimental condition
with a maintenance period free of distraction.
FIGURE 4 | (A) Corrected recognition scores (hit rate—false alarm rate)
in Experiment 2. Unpleasant distractors caused a detrimental effect on
WM accuracy, compared to neutral and pleasant distractors, as well as
to a scenario free of distraction (*p < 0.005; **p < 0.001; ***p < 0.0001).
(B) Mean reaction times for accurate recognitions in Experiment 2.
Pleasant distractors caused a faster performance on WM, compared to
unpleasant distractors and a scenario free of distraction (*p < 0.05;
**p < 0.005). Performance during unpleasant distraction might also tend
to be slower than during neutral distraction (†p = 0.08). Error bars
represent standard error of mean.
Item Analysis
As we did in Experiment 1, we tested the relationship between
the emotional features of pictures and their value as distractors
during the WM task. To do this, we calculated the correlation
between their valence and arousal subjective ratings, and the
averaged recognition and reaction time for each trial in which
they appeared. Valence correlated positively with accuracy
[ρs(88) = 0.23, p < 0.05] and negatively with reaction time
[ρs(88) = −0.27, p < 0.01], while arousal tended to correlate
negatively with accuracy [ρs(88) = −20, p = 0.05] and
positively with reaction time [ρs(88) = −0.25, p < 0.05].
As previously mentioned, although we adjusted the criterion
of selection to keep pleasant and unpleasant conditions equal
in arousal, our volunteers rated unpleasant distractors as more
arousing than pleasant ones. Therefore, partial correlations were
also calculated in order to disentangle the effects of valence
from the effects of arousal. In line with the Experiment 1, the
positive correlation between valence and accuracy wasmarginally
significant (ρvalence, accuracy · arousal = 0.19, p = 0.06)
when the effect of arousal was controlled. Valence also correlated
negatively with reaction time (ρvalence, accuracy · arousal =
−0.26, p < 0.05) when the effect of arousal was controlled.
Again, no significant correlation was found between arousal and
accuracy (ρvalence, accuracy · arousal = −0.13, p > 0.1)
when the effect of valence was controlled, while arousal tended
to positively correlate with reaction time (ρvalence, accuracy ·
arousal= 0.19, p = 0.06).
Discussion
In accordance with the first experiment and previous literature,
the highest forgetting occurs after unpleasant distraction,
extending previous evidence to show that unpleasant events can
work as powerful interferences for WM maintenance (Dolcos
and McCarthy, 2006; Dolcos et al., 2008; Anticevic et al., 2010;
Chuah et al., 2010; Denkova et al., 2010). As in Experiment
1, pleasant distraction does not affect WM more than neutral
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 8 May 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 582
García-Pacios et al. Cognitive control of emotional distraction
distraction. In this regard, although we equated pleasant and
unpleasant pictures in arousal, our volunteers rated unpleasant
pictures as more arousing than pleasant ones. In principle, one
may argue that this fact might account for their differences in
performance. However, if the effect of emotional distractors in
WM were exclusively due to the arousal value, performance
after pleasant distraction should have been worse than after
neutral distraction, since pleasant pictures were rated as more
arousing than neutral stimuli. But this was not the case, as both
pleasant and neutral stimuli showed similar levels of interference.
Furthermore, results from partial correlations between subjective
valence and accuracy, blocking the effect of arousal, and between
subjective arousal and accuracy, blocking the effect of valence,
showed a greater contribution of valence to the power of
emotional stimuli as distractors. This general effect resembles the
one observed in the first experiment, so that the more unpleasant
a distractor is perceived, the higher the probability of forgetting
the information previously encoded.
Additionally, neutral distraction did lead to a higher
forgetting than no-distraction, in accordance with previous
results employing similar tasks (Dolcos and McCarthy, 2006;
Anticevic et al., 2010). These findings provide further evidence
in favor of the detrimental effect of both emotional and non-
emotional distractors in WM and strengthen the interference-
based forgetting theories (Berman et al., 2009).
Results from reaction times were not as straightforward as
in Experiment 1. However, they are in accordance with them,
suggesting that unpleasant distraction might produce higher
cognitive cost even for successful performance. In addition,
higher reactions times were recorded after no-distraction in WM
maintenance. This might be motivated by the duration of the
maintenance stage without any stimuli (4 s in this condition vs.
1 s for the others). The task was also much easier when no-
distraction was presented (accuracy raised almost to 90% in
this condition). Hence, our volunteers might have experienced
a decrease in their concentration, leading to slower (yet more
accurate) responses to probes.
Experiment 3
Experiments 1 and 2 have consistently shown that people can
cope with pleasant distraction as well as with neutral ones,
while the presence of unpleasant irrelevant events negatively
affect their WM performance. Those findings suggest that the
level of the arousal in a distracting stimulus is not the primary
dimension that makes it difficult to control. Rather, the valence
of the stimulus appears to contribute most to its power as an
interference. Our partial correlation analysis in both experiments
supported this rationale, as the valence of distractors correlated
with accuracy in the WM task, when the contribution of arousal
was blocked. In contrast, arousal levels in the distractor did
not predict WM performance when the contribution of valence
was controlled. Even so, it is still possible that differences in
accuracy and results from partial correlations would be reflecting
an attentional bias rather than a cognitive control effect. That
is, our volunteers might have paid less attention to neutral and
pleasant distractors than to unpleasant distractors, and therefore
the former would have interfered less than the latter, what
would finally explain the behavioral differences in the WM task.
Behavioral and psychophysiological studies in the attentional
blink phenomenon (Keil and Ihssen, 2004; Keil et al., 2006; De
Oca et al., 2012) have shown that pleasant stimuli automatically
capture attention more than neutral events, and that they do
so as much as unpleasant stimuli do. However, we cannot be
sure about the actual attentional engagement of our participants
across conditions, since we do not have any direct measure of
that in Experiment 1 and 2. A suitable manner to answer this
open issue would be to make participants explicitly assess each
distractor. Therefore, in Experiment 3 we used exactly the same
WM task that we employed in Experiment 2, but we asked
volunteers to decide whether the scene represented in every
single distractor took place indoors or outdoors, and to report
it by pressing one of two keys. Asking participants to make a
decision about something not related to the emotional features of
the stimuli provided us with information about their attentional
engagement, avoiding potential changes in the interfering power
of pictures derived from an emotional re-evaluation of the event
(Lazarus andAlfert, 1964; Gross and John, 2003). If a participant’s
judgments were accurate and did not show reliable differences
across conditions, we could consider that they voluntarily paid
full attention to the distractors, regardless of their emotional
valence. If this were the case, and if the behavioral pattern of
recognition in the WM task was the same as that observed in
Experiment 1 and 2, we could discard the possibility that our
differences in performance were due to differences in the amount
of attention recruited by the three types of distractors.
Method
Participants
Participants were 26 students from the Camilo José Cela
University of Madrid (mean age 21.2 years; range from 18 to
28 years). They had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. 20
participants were females (18–28 years old and a mean age of
21.3 years) and 6 were males (18–24 years old and a mean
age of 21 years). They all completed the Spanish version of the
Spielberger State-Trait Anxiety Inventory for Adults (Spielberger
et al., 2002) and the Beck Depression Inventory (Beck et al., 2006)
(see Table 1 for demographic information). Volunteers received
course credits for their time.
Materials
Items at encoding and recognition were exactly the same
ones as those used in Experiment 1 and 2 (see Materials in
Experiment 1 and 2), and they were also counterbalanced across
experimental conditions. The interfering items presented during
the maintenance period were the same as those we used in
Experiment 2 (Lang et al., 2005), and were therefore matched in
luminance, contrast, color, and figure-ground relationships. They
were also divided into pleasant, neutral, and unpleasant pictures
(see Table 2 for mean normative values).
Procedure
The delayed-recognition WM paradigm was basically the
same than that used in Experiment 2, four experimental
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conditions no-distraction, pleasant, neutral, and unpleasant
distractions were also used, all of which comprised 30 trials.
The trial structure, times of presentation, instructions and
pseudorandomization of trials were the same as those used in
Experiment 2. No-distraction trials were also presented in a
separate block to avoid potential experimental artifacts that have
been previously reported (Anticevic et al., 2010) (see Procedure
in Experiment 2). However, in this experiment, volunteers had to
respond whether the scene represented in the distracting picture
occurred indoors or outdoors, and press one of two keys to
report it. We avoided asking participants about the emotional
features of the pictures, as we did not want them to re-assess their
emotional content, as this might modify participant’s emotional
perception of the distractors, and therefore also modify their
power as interferences (Lazarus and Alfert, 1964; Gross and John,
2003).
Results
Indoors/Outdoors Judgments
Volunteers were highly engaged in the judgment of whether the
distracting scene took place indoors or outdoors, with responses
over 85% correct in all conditions. A One-Way repeated-
measures ANOVA revealed no significant differences in accuracy
across conditions [F(2, 24) = 1.16, p > 0.1, η
2
= 0.08].
Accuracy
Figure 5A plots the corrected recognition score (hit rate—false
alarm rate) for each condition, averaged across participants.
A One-Way repeated-measures ANOVA revealed a significant
main effect of condition [F(3, 23) = 16.16, p < 0.0001, η
2
=
0.67]. Pairwise comparisons showed lower performance during
unpleasant distraction compared to no-distraction (p < 0.0001),
pleasant (p < 0.001) and neutral distraction (p < 0.05).
Performance during pleasant and neutral distraction was also
worse than during no-distraction (p < 0.05; and p < 0.005,
respectively). No differences were found between pleasant and
neutral distraction (p > 0.1). These results were confirmed when
statistical analysis were computed on the d’-values estimated for
each condition [F(3, 23) = 12.21, p < 0.0001, η
2
= 0.61; no-
distraction > pleasant (p = 0.005), neutral (p = 0.005) and
unpleasant (p < 0.0001); pleasant > unpleasant (p = 0.001);
neutral > unpleasant (p < 0.05); pleasant = neutral (p > 0.1)].
Reaction Times
Figure 5B shows mean reaction times for correctly recognized
items in each condition. Results from One-Way repeated-
measures ANOVA yielded a main effect of condition [F(3, 23) =
3.25, p < 0.05, η2 = 0.11]. Pairwise comparisons showed
slower performance during unpleasant distraction compared
to no-distraction (p < 0.05) and a tendency towards slower
performance after pleasant and neutral distraction than after no-
distraction (p = 0.07 and p = 0.08, respectively). There were no
differences between pleasant and neutral distraction (p > 0.1),
between pleasant and unpleasant distraction (p > 0.1), nor
between neutral and unpleasant distraction (p > 0.1).
Subjective Emotional Ratings
In line with Experiment 1 and 2, subjective valence ratings
differed as a function of affective category [F(2, 24) = 119.68, p <
0.0001, η2 = 0.90], with pleasant pictures rated as most pleasant
followed by neutral pictures, and unpleasant pictures rated as
least pleasant (p < 0.0001 for all comparisons). Arousal ratings
also varied as a function of affective category [F(2, 24) = 50.04,
p < 0.0001, η2 = 0.80], with pleasant and unpleasant pictures
rated as more arousing than neutral pictures (p < 0.0001 for
all comparisons). As happened in Experiment 2, our volunteers
rated, on average, unpleasant pictures as more arousing than
pleasant pictures (p < 0.05), although both sets of pictures were
selected to be equal in arousal (see Table 2 for mean normative
values and mean subjective values).
Item Analysis
In line with Experiment 1 and 2, we explored the relationship
between the emotional features of pictures and their value as
interference during the WM task, by correlating valence and
arousal subjective ratings with the averaged recognition and
reaction time for each trial in which they appeared. Valence
tended to correlate positively with accuracy [ρs(88) = 0.23, p <
0.05] and did not correlate with reaction time [ρs(88) = −0.19,
p = 0.07]. Arousal did not correlate with accuracy [ρs(88) =
0.03, p > 0.1] nor with reaction time [ρs(88) = 0.06, p >
0.1]. Partial correlations were also calculated to disentangle the
effects of valence from the effects of arousal. In accordance with
Experiment 1 and 2, valence correlated positively with accuracy
(ρvalence, accuracy · arousal = 0.22, p < 0.05) when the
effect of arousal was controlled. Valence also tended to correlate
negatively with reaction time (ρvalence, accuracy · arousal =
−0.18, p = 0.08) when the effect of arousal was controlled.
Again, no significant correlation was found between arousal and
accuracy (ρvalence, accuracy · arousal = −0.01, p > 0.1) nor
with reaction time (ρvalence, accuracy · arousal= 0.00, p > 0.1)
when the effect of valence was controlled.
Discussion
In Experiments 1 and 2, we replicated previous results in
the literature, showing that unpleasant distracting events do
affect the maintenance of non-emotional information in WM
(Dolcos and McCarthy, 2006; Dolcos et al., 2008; Anticevic
et al., 2010; Chuah et al., 2010; Denkova et al., 2010). Our
results also revealed that pleasant distractors did not affect WM
maintenance more than neutral distractors, suggesting that the
valence dimension is the main feature that turns an emotional
event into a powerful interference. Partial correlation analysis
in both experiments further supported such rationale. However,
one might still be concerned about how much attention our
participants had voluntarily paid to each type of distractor. In
other words, our volunteers might just have ignored the neutral
and pleasant distracting pictures, when compared with the
unpleasant stimuli. Behavioral and psychophysiological studies
in the attentional blink phenomenon (Keil and Ihssen, 2004; Keil
et al., 2006; De Oca et al., 2012) have reported that pleasant
stimuli actually capture attention as much as unpleasant stimuli
do, but even so, there was a considerable degree of uncertainty
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FIGURE 5 | (A) Corrected recognition scores (hit rate—false alarm rate) in
Experiment 3. Unpleasant distractors caused a detrimental effect on WM
accuracy, compared to neutral and pleasant distractors, as well as to a
scenario free of distraction (*p < 0.05; **p < 0.005; ***p < 0.001;
****p < 0.0001). (B) Mean reaction times for accurate recognitions in
Experiment 2. Unpleasant distractors caused a slower performance on WM,
compared to a scenario free of distraction (*p < 0.05). Performance during
pleasant and neutral distraction might also tend to be slower than during
no-distraction (†p = 0.07 and † † p = 0.08, respectively). Error bars represent
standard error of mean.
in our experiments regarding this issue, since we did not have
any direct measure of the actual attentional engagement of
our participants across conditions. In this last experiment, we
controlled this matter by asking our participants to make an
assessment of each distractor, within the WM task, and to
inform about this evaluation by pressing one of two buttons. Our
volunteers were highly successful at judging whether or not the
distraction scene took place indoors or outdoors, which confirms
that they truly paid attention to the distracting stimuli. More
importantly, there were no differences in this measure between
conditions, revealing that they initially processed all types of
distractors to the same extent. This manipulation did not seem
to affect overall performance, as the corrected recognition score
in each condition was similar to those reported in Experiment 1
and 2. Interestingly enough, the overall WM performance in this
experiment, with the potential effect of differential attentional
bias controlled, resembled the pattern observed in our two first
experiments. Although biologically relevant, pleasant distractors
did not affect WM maintenance more than neutral and non-
emotional events. Again, partial correlation analysis revealed a
contribution of valence rather than of arousal, to the power
of emotional stimuli as distractors. Also, higher forgetting after
neutral distraction was observed, in comparison with a WM
maintenance free of distraction, further supporting interference-
based forgetting theories (Berman et al., 2009).
In summary, this third experiment provides further evidence
regarding the differential effect of two types of emotional
distraction, pleasant and unpleasant events, in WM. As
participants equally paid attention to all distractors, these results
suggest that unpleasant stimuli were more interfering due to
a weaker reallocation of cognitive resources after the initial
attentional response.
Re-Analysis of Experiments 2 and 3
Despite the converging results from Experiments 1, 2, and
3, a possible limitation of the current study is in regard to
the subjective arousal ratings of participants in Experiments 2
and 3. Although we selected pleasant and unpleasant pictures
equal in arousal, based on their IAPS normative values,
our volunteers rated pleasant pictures as less arousing than
unpleasant stimuli, which might make it difficult to disentangle
the effects of valence from the effects of arousal. However,
in both experiments, results from partial correlations between
these emotional dimensions and accuracy, blocking first the
effect of arousal and then the effect of valence, point to
valence as the primary dimension responsible for the power of
emotional stimuli as distractors. Furthermore, if arousal instead
of valence were the most contributory dimension, performance
after pleasant distraction would have been worse than after
neutral distraction, since pleasant stimuli were rated as more
arousing than neutral pictures. Still, a partial contribution of
arousal cannot be completely discarded in light of the present
data. Thus, in this last experiment we reanalyzed the data
from Experiments 2 and 3, in which we employed exactly
the same distracting stimuli, to compare those volunteers that
subjectively perceived pleasant and unpleasant distractors as
equally arousing with those who rated the unpleasant distractors
as more arousing than pleasant scenes. If arousal had not an
effect in participant’s performance in the WM task, as we suggest
based on results from our three previous experiments, both
groups of participants should show the same overall effect.
However, if the lower performance after unpleasant distraction
were explained by the fact that volunteers perceived them as
more arousing than the pleasant stimuli, the group of participants
that perceived both conditions equal in arousal should also
show equivalent performance after both pleasant and unpleasant
distraction. By contrast, the group of volunteers that rated
unpleasant pictures as more arousing should still exhibit the
greater WM impairment after unpleasant than after pleasant
distractors.
Method
Participants, Procedure, and Materials
Data from all participants in Experiment 2 (n = 43) and 3
(n = 26) were employed in this experiment (total n = 69),
as items at the encoding and recognition stages, and interfering
scenes were exactly the same as those experiments.
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First, for each participant, we computed a repeated measures
t-test between subjective arousal rating for pleasant and
for unpleasant distractors. Twenty three participants showed
equivalent arousal rating between both conditions (p > 0.1) and
were included in the Balanced Arousal Group. Forty participants
showed higher arousal ratings for unpleasant than for pleasant
distractors (p < 0.05) and therefore were included in the
Unbalanced Arousal Group. Four participants who showed
neither a robust difference nor a clear equivalent arousal rating
(p-values between 0.05 and 0.1) were excluded from further
analysis. Finally, two volunteers who rated pleasant scenes as
more arousing than unpleasant stimuli were also excluded from
the analysis in order to reduce noise in the analysis. Thus, a final
sample of 63 participants took part in this re-analysis.
As the Unbalanced Arousal Group had almost twice the size of
the Balanced Arousal Group, we also computed the analysis using
a subsample of 23 participants from the biggest group. To do this,
we randomly selected 23 participants from the whole Unbalanced
Arousal Group and compared them with the 23 participants in
the Balanced Arousal Group. In order to prevent an effect on
the results due to the random down-sampling of the Unbalanced
Arousal Group, we repeated this procedure three more times
and computed the analysis using these three different randomly
down-sampled groups (see Supplementary Materials).
Results
Accuracy
Figure 6A plots the corrected recognition score (hit rate–false
alarm rate) for each group and condition, averaged across
participants. A One-Way repeated-measures ANOVA with a
between subjects factor revealed a significant main effect of
condition [F(3, 59) = 29.53, p < 0.0001, η
2
= 0.60]. Pairwise
comparisons showed lower performance during unpleasant
distraction compared to no-distraction (p < 0.0001), pleasant
(p < 0.0001) and neutral distraction (p < 0.0001). Performance
during pleasant and neutral distraction was also worse than
during no-distraction (p < 0.0001; and p < 0.0001,
respectively). No differences were found between pleasant and
neutral distraction (p > 0.1). Neither the effect of group
[F(1, 61) = 0.40, p > 0.1, η
2
= 0.007] nor the effect of interaction
[F(3, 59) = 0.32, p > 0.1, η
2
= 0.01] were significant.
These results were confirmed when statistical analysis were
computed on the d’-values estimated for each condition. The
main effect of condition was significant [F(3, 59) = 21.96 p <
0.0001, η2 = 0.52; no-distraction > pleasant (p = 0.0001),
neutral (p = 0.0001) and unpleasant (p < 0.0001); pleasant >
unpleasant (p = 0.0001); neutral > unpleasant (p < 0.0001);
pleasant = neutral (p > 0.1]. Again, neither the effect of group
[F(1, 61) = 0.83, p > 0.1, η
2
= 0.01] nor the effect of interaction
[F(3, 59) = 0.86, p > 0.1, η
2
= 0.04] were significant.
As the sizes of groups were notably different, and this might
affect the results of the analysis, we repeated the analysis using a
subsample of the biggest group, as previously described in the
Participants, Procedure, and Materials section. Again the One-
Way repeated-measures ANOVA with a between subjects factor
revealed a significant main effect of condition [F(3, 42) = 28.08,
p < 0.0001, η2 = 0.66]. Pairwise comparisons also showed
lower performance during unpleasant distraction compared to
no-distraction (p < 0.0001), pleasant (p < 0.0001) and neutral
distraction (p = 0.001). Performance during pleasant and neutral
distraction was also worse than during no-distraction (p <
0.0001; and p < 0.0001, respectively). No differences were
found between pleasant and neutral distraction (p > 0.1). In
accordance with results on corrected recognition scores, neither
the effect of group [F(1, 44) = 0.14, p > 0.1, η
2
= 0.01] nor the
effect of interaction [F(3, 42) = 0.14, p > 0.1, η
2
= 0.01] were
significant.
Results on d′-values also mirrored those on corrected
recognition scores. The main effect of condition was significant
[F(3, 42) = 21.61 p < 0.0001, η
2
= 0.60; no-distraction >
pleasant (p < 0.0001), neutral (p < 0.0001) and unpleasant
(p < 0.0001); pleasant > unpleasant (p < 0.0001); neutral >
unpleasant (p = 0.001); pleasant = neutral (p > 0.1)]. Again,
neither the effect of group [F(1, 61) = 0.34, p > 0.1, η
2
= 0.008]
nor the effect of interaction [F(3,42) = 0.35, p > 0.1, η
2
= 0.02]
were significant.
Although random, the actual down-sampling of the
Unbalanced Arousal Group might still have had an effect in the
analysis. To account for this potential problem, we performed
three different random down-samplings and computed the
same analysis on them. In each case, the results replicated the
findings reported here, for both corrected recognition scores and
d’-values (see Supplementary Materials).
Reaction Times
Figure 6B shows mean reaction times for correctly recognized
items in each group and condition. Results from a One-Way
repeated-measures ANOVA with a between subjects factor did
not show effects of condition [F(3, 59) = 1.26, p > 0.1, η
2
=
0.06], group [F(1, 61) = 1.36, p > 0.1, η
2
= 0.02] or interaction
[F(3, 59) = 0.20, p > 0.1, η
2
= 0.01].
This analysis showed the same results when using a subsample
of the biggest group, for the effect of condition [F(3, 42) = 0.82,
p > 0.1, η2 = 0.05], group [F(1, 44) = 0.72, p > 0.1, η
2
=
0.01] or interaction [F(3, 42) = 0.36, p > 0.1, η
2
= 0.02] (see
also Supplementary Materials for results using different random
down-samplings).
Subjective Emotional Ratings
As expected, subjective valence ratings differed as a function
of affective category in both groups of participants [Balanced
Arousal Group: F(2, 21) = 72.08, p < 0.0001, η
2
= 0.87;
Unbalanced Arousal Group: F(2, 38) = 365.56, p < 0.0001, η
2
=
0.95], with pleasant pictures rated as most pleasant followed by
neutral pictures, and unpleasant pictures rated as least pleasant
(p < 0.0001 for all comparisons in both groups).
Arousal ratings also varied as a function of affective category
[Balanced Arousal Group: F(2, 21) = 46.05, p < 0.0001,
η
2
= 0.81; Unbalanced Arousal Group F(2, 38) = 197.14,
p < 0.0001, η2 = 0.91]. Both groups of participants rated
pleasant and unpleasant pictures as more arousing than neutral
pictures (p < 0.0001 for all comparisons in both groups)
and, as expected, participants in the Balanced Arousal Group
rated pleasant and unpleasant scenes as equally arousing (p >
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 12 May 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 582
García-Pacios et al. Cognitive control of emotional distraction
FIGURE 6 | (A) Corrected recognition scores (hit rate—false alarm rate) in the
Re-Analysis of Experiments 2 and 3. Unpleasant distractors caused a
detrimental effect on WM accuracy, compared to neutral and pleasant
distractors, as well as to a scenario free of distraction (*p < 0.0001). Neither the
effect of Group nor the effect of interaction between Group and Condition were
significant (B)Mean reaction times for accurate recognitions in Experiment 2.
Neither the effect of Condition nor the effect of group nor the effect of
interaction were significant. Error bars represent standard error of mean.
0.1), while participants in the Unbalanced Arousal Group rated
unpleasant pictures as more arousing than pleasant scenes (p <
0.0001).
Subjective emotional rating in the randomly down-sampled
group mirrored those in the whole Unbalanced Arousal Group,
with valence differing as a function of affective category
[F(2, 21) = 173.88, p < 0.0001, η
2
= 0.94], with pleasant
pictures rated as most pleasant followed by neutral pictures, and
unpleasant pictures rated as least pleasant (p < 0.0001 for all
comparisons), and arousal also differing as a function of affective
category [Balanced Arousal Group: F(2, 21) = 86.47, p < 0.0001,
η
2
= 0.89] with pleasant and unpleasant pictures rated as more
arousing than neutral pictures (p < 0.0001 for all comparisons)
(see Table 3 for mean normative values and mean subjective
values). This pattern did not change in the three different random
down-samplings (see Supplementary Materials).
Discussion
Experiments 1, 2, and 3 consistently showed that unpleasant
distraction can impair the maintenance of non-emotional
information in WM, while our executive system seems to be
able to control pleasant distraction as well as neutral distraction.
However, the fact that participants rated the unpleasant distractor
as more arousing than the pleasant scenes is still a limitation
in those experiments, especially in Experiments 2 and 3,
where pleasant and unpleasant pictures were equivalent in
arousal, based on their IAPS normative values. That is, our
participants might have experienced a higher interference during
the unpleasant distraction condition just because the scenes in
that condition were more arousing than the scenes in the other
two conditions. If this was true, one might also have expected
worse performance after pleasant distraction than after neutral
distraction, since pleasant scenes were rated as more arousing
than neutral pictures, but this was not the case. Even though, we
could not discard a potential contribution of arousal to the WM
effect.
In this re-analysis we addressed this final concern by
comparing those participants who perceived pleasant and
unpleasant distractors equally arousing to those who rated
the unpleasant distractors as more arousing than the pleasant
scenes. Results from our re-analysis showed that the Unbalanced
Arousal Group does show the same performance pattern that has
been reported in Experiments 1, 2, and 3. More interestingly,
participants in the Balanced Arousal group also exhibited lower
WM accuracy after unpleasant distraction than after pleasant and
neutral distraction. If the primary reason that the unpleasant
scenes were more distracting was their higher level of perceived
arousal, participants in this last group, who rated both pleasant
and unpleasant scenes equal in arousal, should have experienced
the same amount of interference during both types of distraction,
but this was not the case. Moreover, our analysis did not reveal an
effect of group and, critical for discarding a potential contribution
of the arousal, they did not reveal an effect of interaction between
group and condition. These results were also confirmed when
the sample size of the groups was taken into account (see also
Supplementary Materials).
In conclusion, results from this re-analysis support the
findings reported in the three previous experiments while
discarding a potential role of the arousal to the differences
between pleasant and unpleasant scenes as distractors in WM.
Discussion and Conclusions
Few papers have addressed the effect of task-irrelevant emotional
information during the maintenance of task-relevant non-
emotional information, with the general finding that unpleasant
distraction causes a negative effect in WM performance (Dolcos
and McCarthy, 2006; Dolcos et al., 2008; Anticevic et al., 2010;
Chuah et al., 2010; Denkova et al., 2010). Furthermore, the effect
of pleasant distraction in WM remained unexplored. In four
experiments we attempted to unravel the effect of both pleasant
and unpleasant distractors in WM, when compared to non-
emotional distractors, as well as to a scenario free of distraction.
Results from all experiments confirmed the general finding that
unpleasant distraction increases the probability of forgetting in
short-term memory (Dolcos and McCarthy, 2006; Dolcos et al.,
2008; Anticevic et al., 2010; Chuah et al., 2010; Denkova et al.,
2010). This effect has been previously explained by the biological
relevance of emotional stimuli. Provided that emotional stimuli
represent crucial information for survival, our cognitive system
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TABLE 3 | Mean subjective ratings of pictures used in the Re-Analysis of Experiments 2 and 3.
Condition Balanced group Unbalanced group Random down-sampling
Subjective valence Subjective arousal Subjective valence Subjective arousal Subjective valence Subjective arousal
Pleasant 7.40(0.97) 5.88(1.90) 7.10(0.77) 5.26(1.06) 7.13(0.77) 5.49(1.03)
Neutral 4.99(0.44) 2.87(1.42) 5.07(0.45) 2.18(1.13) 4.98(0.46) 2.41(1.32)
Unpleasant 2.77(1.14) 6.07(1.80) 2.24(0.62) 7.00(0.90) 2.16(0.71) 7.08(0.85)
Standard deviations are showed in parenthesis.
tends to process them automatically (Bradley et al., 2003). In
many occasions, this supposes an advantage since it helps us
to exert more adaptive responses (Dolan, 2002) but when the
most adaptive behavior entails ignoring emotional stimuli, they
can compete with the maintenance of relevant information,
worsening the performance of the ongoing task (Dolcos and
McCarthy, 2006; Dolcos et al., 2008; Anticevic et al., 2010; Chuah
et al., 2010; Denkova et al., 2010). According to this idea, pleasant
emotional stimuli, which are also better remembered when
they are task-relevant (Schmidt and Williams, 2001), should
similarly worsen WM performance. Unexpectedly, results from
Experiments 1 and 2 showed equivalent performance for neutral
and pleasant distraction, suggesting that the valence might be the
crucial dimension in an emotional-based interference effect. This
was further supported by partial correlation analysis where the
effect of arousal was controlled.
In light of these results, two different mechanisms may be
proposed to account for differences in WM. First, unpleasant
distractors may elicit a greater attentional response than neutral
and pleasant distractors do, and therefore they may be processed
more in depth, resulting in greater interference with the
maintenance of relevant information. Although this may be true
for neutral pictures, as it is well known that they recruit less
attention than emotional events (Lang et al., 1998; Morris et al.,
1998; Bradley et al., 2003; Sabatinelli et al., 2005), behavioral and
psychophysiological studies have revealed that pleasant stimuli
recruit as much attention as unpleasant stimuli do (Keil and
Ihssen, 2004; Keil et al., 2006; De Oca et al., 2012). However,
it is also possible that differences in WM performance between
unpleasant and pleasant distractors were due to differences in the
capacity of our executive control to reallocate cognitive resources
after the initial attentional response. Unpleasant stimuli represent
threatening information that is biologically important, so it is
conceivable that the inhibition of the automatic processing of
emotional information, in favor of the reallocation of resources
to the ongoing task, was harder for unpleasant than for pleasant
distractors. Thus, forgetting after unpleasant distraction may be
more likely to happen than after pleasant or neutral distraction
(Dolcos and McCarthy, 2006; Dolcos et al., 2008; Anticevic et al.,
2010; Chuah et al., 2010; Denkova et al., 2010).
Even so, a lack of a direct measure of participant’s attentional
engagement across conditions left this question open. Although
it seems improbable, our participants might voluntarily have
been paying less attention to pleasant and neutral distractors
than to unpleasant pictures and therefore, the processing
of such information would have not even been initiated.
Our manipulation in the third experiment, where we asked
volunteers to pay attention to the distracting pictures and
report their assessment, discarded that alternative explanation,
as participants were highly and equally engaged across the three
conditions. Since in these circumstances the pattern of WM
performance did not vary from those observed in the Experiment
1 and 2, it can be argued that differences between pleasant and
neutral distraction, when compared with unpleasant distraction
are not due to a differential voluntary attentional engagement
across conditions but to a differences in our cognitive capacity
to override an automatic deep processing of the distractors.
Nevertheless, these three experiments left an open question,
regarding a potential contribution of arousal to the reportedWM
effect, as overall, our participants perceived the unpleasant scenes
as more arousing than the pleasant distractors, even when we
selected both types of distractors to be equal in arousal, based on
their IAPS normative values. To account for this final limitation,
we performed a re-analysis to compare the WM performance
of those participants who rated both types of distracting scenes
equally arousing, to those who rated unpleasant pictures as more
arousing than pleasant stimuli. Results from this re-analysis
confirmed that both groups of participants did not differ in
WM performance, and that both experienced higher interference
during unpleasant distraction than after pleasant or neutral
distraction.
Finally, previous studies in this field have addressed
the effect of non-emotional distraction when compared to
free-distraction maintenance. Although some of them found
equivalent performance after neutral distraction and after non-
interference maintenance (Chuah et al., 2010; Denkova et al.,
2010), some others reported a better performance after no-
distraction scenario than after neutral distraction (Dolcos
and McCarthy, 2006; Anticevic et al., 2010). Our volunteers
experience higher forgetting after neutral distraction than during
a free-distractor maintenance period in both Experiment 2 and 3.
This result provides further support in favor of the interference-
based forgetting theories (Berman et al., 2009).
In conclusion, the present study supports previous evidence
by showing that unpleasant stimuli do affect the maintenance of
non-emotional information in WM. But, more specifically, in a
series of three interrelated experiments and one re-analysis, the
current study shows for the first time that pleasant distraction
does not necessarily affect WM as unpleasant distraction does.
A lower capacity of our executive control to reallocate cognitive
resources after unpleasant distraction seems to account for its
value as interference in WM.
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